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EQUESTRIAN IMMUNITY AND SPORT RESPONSIBILITY
STATUTES: ALTERING OBLIGATIONS AND
PLACING THEM ON PARTICIPANTS
TERENCE J. CENTNER*
Compensation for injuries is influenced by a legal system that
facilitates lawsuits based on fault.1 Any inferior service or deviation
from a norm presents an opportunity for litigation based on negli-
gence.2 An aggressive and assertive legal community encourages
dissatisfied individuals to sue others for damages. 3 A perusal of re-
ported lawsuits discloses a fixation on blaming others,4 an expan-
sive system for settling disputes, and litigants who do not have a
good idea of how courts will respond to a case. 5 Due to the uncer-
tainty, unpleasantness, and expense of litigation, individuals, firms,
and governments feel compelled to adopt defensive measures.6
* Professor, College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences, The Univer-
sity of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602. This research is based on work supported by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Cooperative State Research, Education, and
Extension Service Project No. GEO00890.
1. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort
Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 585, 624 (2003) (discussing how courts apportion damages
among multiple injurers based on "modern rule" of comparative fault); Ellen S.
Pryor, Rehabilitating Tort Compensation, 91 GEO. L.J. 659, 688 (2003) ("Compensa-
tion can symbolize public recognition of the transgressor's fault by requiring some-
thing important to be given up on one side and received on the other." (citing
Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DuKE LJ. 56, 69
(1993))).
2. E.g., Odenthal v. Minn. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426,
436 n.10 (Minn. 2002) (quoting Osborne v. McMasters, 41 N.W. 543, 54-44
(Minn. 1889)) (observing that negligence is breach of duty set by common law or
statute). Specifically, "[i]n either case [statute or common law] the failure to per-
form the duty constitutes negligence, and renders the party liable for injuries re-
sulting from it." Id.
3. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin & MartinJ. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the
Law, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 807, 815-16 (1994) (classifying Association of Trial Lawyers
of America ("ALTA") as interest group in which plaintiffs' attorneys share informa-
tion and strategies).
4. For a summary of cases that demonstrate fixation on blaming others, see
infra notes 23-31, 49-56, and accompanying text.
5. See James R. Levine, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposal for Institutional
Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1538, 1558 (2000) (noting first workers' compensation
statutes were adopted to avoid unpredictable tort judgments). These unpredict-
able and arbitrary judgments prevented litigants from reasonably estimating
courts' judgments. See id. at 1558-59 (inferring litigants' inability to predict from
inconsistent judgments).
6. See, e.g., Scott Burris, Dental Discrimination Against the HIV-Infected: Empirical
Data, Law and Public Policy, 13 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 55-56 (1996) (discussing results of
(37)
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People should be able to understand laws. American rules for
tort lawsuits disclose an intimidating legal system confronting both
service providers and injured persons. 7 In protecting individuals
and their rights, we sometimes neglect the rights of neighbors, ser-
vice providers, and society as a whole. 8 To offer more protection to
service providers, many state legislatures have altered the rights of
persons participating in recreational and sport activities.9 The leg-
islative changes place greater responsibilities on participants.10
Rather than continuing with tort principles that force activity prov-
iders to insure participants against all risks, 1 new equestrian immu-
nity and sport responsibility statutes place obligations on
participants. Statutory provisions allow some accidents to be re-
solved without resorting to litigation. These legislative enactments
Harvard Malpractice study cited in PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRAC-
TICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 124-
29 (1993)). "In response to malpractice fears, physicians' behavior tends to involve
greater use of 'defensive' measures and more paperwork rather than the increased
care the tort model predicts." Id.
7. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The
American CivilJustice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 38-
54 (2002) (discussing initial erosion of barriers to recovery and expansion of du-
ties under tort law and "Neo-conservative Tort Law Retrenchment").
8. See, e.g., Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the
Searchfor Community, 18 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 27, 29 (2002) (postulating that
our preoccupation with individual rights and economic self-maximization has
caused us to neglect social nature of our existence); Eric T. Freyfogle, Land Owner-
ship and the Level of Regulation: The Particulars of Owning, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 574, 584
(1999) (noting preoccupation with individual rights leads to detriment of environ-
mental quality). "When anti-environmental forces unfurl the private-property ban-
ner, employing the rhetoric of individual rights in good American style, they
implicitly assert that land health has become too dominant a goal." Freyfogle,
supra, at 584; see, e.g., Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-Farm Laws Reconsidered: Ten Reasons
Why Legislative Efforts to Resolve Agricultural Nuisances May Be Ineffective, 3 DRAKE J.
AGRJC. L. 103, 105 (1998) (acknowledging "right-to-farm laws require a realloca-
tion of property rights (or at least of societal priorities)"). Further, "[f] or [right-to-
farm] laws to work, some conduct that previously would have been actionable as a
nuisance is now protected . . " Hamilton, supra, at 105.
9. See infra Tables 1 and 2 (listing equestrian immunity statutes and sport re-
sponsibility statutes of numerous states).
10. See Terence J. Centner, Tort Liability for Sport and Recreational Activities: Ex-
panding Statutory Immunity for Protected Classes and Activities, 26J. LEGIS. 1, 2 (2000)
[hereinafter Centner, Tort Liability] (discussing states' adoption of statutes limiting
tort liability).
11. See, e.g., Jones v. Walker, 433 S.E.2d 726, 728-29 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (re-
jecting defendant's vicarious liability argument for horse show injuries under fam-
ily purpose doctrine); Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 872 P.2d 782, 786-92 (Mont. 1994)
(analyzing defendant ski operator's duties to skiers under MONT. CODE ANN. 423-2-
733 (1989)); Murphy v. N. Am. River Runners, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 504, 511-12 (W. Va.
1991) (discussing statutory duties imposed on whitewater outfitters regarding lia-
bility for whitewater rafting accident under W. VA. CODE §§ 20-3B-1 to 20-3B-5
(1987)).
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provide ideas for additional actions that might reduce reliance on
our inefficient liability system.
This Article first examines the differences in safety approaches
between Americans and Europeans based on personal experiences
and legal research. It next considers the impact of major changes
in American tort law, particularly focusing on how these changes
have responded to societal concerns and ultimately resulted in
greater numbers of injured plaintiffs maintaining lawsuits. Finally,
this Article acknowledges policy-driven proposals, common law
principles, and statutory solutions that have been offered to curtail
tort litigation. Specifically, it analyzes equestrian immunity and
sports responsibility statutes' attempts to excuse providers of activi-
ties from incurring liability for some accidents. Based on these
findings, this Article proposes that future changes to the American
tort system should model the success of equestrian immunity and
sports responsibility statutes by enacting obligations on participants
to reduce litigation and accompanying expenses.
I. PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND LAWSUITS
I recently had an opportunity to live and work in Europe, dur-
ing which my family joined me for an opportunity to live abroad.
After observing people and settings in Germany and other Euro-
pean countries, different approaches to safety became evident.
Europeans appear to believe in personal responsibility as opposed
to strict liability. 12 Europeans teach their children to take care of
themselves and to avoid potentially harmful situations. Americans
look to their schools, police, and government to keep people safe.'3
When a society places responsibilities on individuals rather than
others, including governments, it affects liability. Persons who ac-
cept responsibility are less likely to feel that others are at fault. A
legal system involving a low level of personal responsibility facili-
12. See, e.g., Andrew C. Spacone, Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a
United States Analog, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 341, 373 (2000) (contrasting
Europeans' and Americans' generalized beliefs about manufacturers' liability); An-
drei Sirabionian, Comment, Why Tobacco Litigation Has Not Been Successful in the
United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis of Tobacco Litigation in the United States and the
United Kingdom, 25 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 485, 505 (2005) (associating failure of
European cases against tobacco industry to European perception of "personal
responsibility").
13. See, e.g., Breaux v. Miami Beach, 899 So. 2d 1059, 1066 (Fla. 2005) (con-
cluding city had duty to warn of dangers known and those that "should have been
known").
3
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tates liability disputes. 14 Injured persons may claim responsibility
rests with someone else. Absent clearly assigned obligations, addi-
tional disagreements over responsibility arise.1 5 Moreover, people
blame others and sue. 1
6
My experiences with public swimming pools show differences
between European and American liability rules. The German sub-
urb where we lived contained an indoor recreational facility with
two pools. A shallow pool about two and one-half feet deep was
available for those who could not swim. Young children playing all
types of water games used this pool. A second larger pool was for
swimming. We searched for the lifeguards, but could not see any-
one. There were two men in an office with glass windows overlook-
ing the shallow pool; they were managers of the facility. There were
no lifeguards despite the presence of more than fifty swimmers, in-
cluding young children. Europeans tend to care for themselves
and watch out for others. 17 Parents looked after their children and
knew that other parents would assist if needed. If a swimmer exper-
ienced a difficulty, whoever was nearby would help out. Because
Europeans expect people to care for themselves, they may forgo
supervision at public pools. Under American negligence law, how-
ever, swimmers and other sport participants expect sport providers
to guarantee their safety.' 8 American sports participants experienc-
ing a mishap are more likely to blame the sport provider for not
implementing greater safety precautions. Thus, American swim-
14. See Douglas H. Cook, Personal Responsibility and the Law of Torts, 45 AM. U.
L. REV. 1245, 1268 (1996) (suggesting utilization of insurance availability could
reduce tort litigation).
15. See, e.g., Walker v. Eleby, 842 A.2d 389, 390-91 (Pa. 2004) (analyzing state
statute unclearly outlining Pennsylvania liability for injuries occurring on sidewalk
next to state highway).
16. See Stephen D. Sugarman, A Century of Change in Personal Injury Law, 88
CAL. L. REV. 2403, 2409-10 (2000) (noting people attempt to transfer blame to
others).
17. See Christopher H. White, Comment, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: The
Casefor Reform of the Rescue Doctrine, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 507, 510 n. 16 (2002) (noting
duty to rescue in number of European countries); Morton J. Horwitz, Conceptualiz-
ing the Right of Access to Technology, 79 WASH. L. REV. 105, 106 (2004) (contrasting
duty established by European countries to United States). Furthermore, "[o]ne
may be surprised to learn that in the United States there is no duty to rescue the
baby [lying face down in a puddle], while in most European countries such a duty
does exist, sometimes extending even to criminal liability." Horwitz, supra, at 106
(citing Edward A. Tomlinson, The French Experience with Duty To Rescue, 20 N.Y.L.
ScH. J. INT'L & COmP. L. 451, 451-52 (2000)).
18. This is part of common law negligence and may be augmented through a
statute or regulation. See, e.g., OHIo ADMIN. CODE 3701-31-04(K)(3) (2004) (in-
jecting requirement to "prominently" place sign to warn potential pool users that
there is no lifeguard).
[Vol. 13: p. 37
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol13/iss1/1
2006] EQUESTRIAN IMMUNITY AND SPORT RESPONSIBILITY 41
ming pools and public beaches need lifeguards. 19 Americans do
not expect swimmers to take care of themselves or their neigh-
bors. 20 Even with lifeguards present, swimmers in trouble are not
always helped and drown. 21 American tort law encourages families
of persons who are injured to blame the facility and property
owners.
22
Skiing accidents also exemplify sport providers' presumed duty
to participants for injuries despite the participants' carelessness.
Skiers have sued ski operators for injuries resulting from their fail-
ure to stay on ski trails, 23 collisions into signposts, 24 or falling from
a chairlift.25 De Lacy v. Catamount Dev. Corp., involves a seven-year-
old child who fell from a chairlift and illustrates the expectation
that someone other than the injured party should be liable. 26 The
child had been skiing for two seasons and had an accident while
using a chairlift.27 The defendant argued that the child had raised
19. Compare Andrews v. Dep't of Natural Res., 557 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (reversing summaryjudgment for defendant because possibility existed
that state's failure to post "no swimming" signs breached duty), with Pelz v. Clear-
water, 568 So. 2d 949, 951 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (granting summary judgment
for defendant in drowning case because city had no notice of danger). Despite
different outcomes, Andrews and Pelz demonstrate some of the necessary precau-
tions public beaches must implement to defend against lawsuits. See, e.g., Andrews,
557 So. 2d at 88 (discussing defendant's use of lifeguards at Dog Beach and signifi-
cance of designating beach as swimming area). But see, e.g., Pelz, 568 So. 2d at 951
(distinguishing from Andrews because state was on notice of dangerous swimming
area while in Pelz, state "cannot be held liable as a private owner for unknown
dangerous conditions in a body of water under its control after its surveys of the
area revealed no such conditions").
20. See, e.g., Andrews, 557 So. 2d at 88 (obligating state with common law duty
to operate beach safely if state designated beach as swimming area).
21. See, e.g., Frazier v. Metro. Dade County, 701 So. 2d 418, 419-21 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (applying damage apportionment among Metropolitan Dade
County and deceased's mother and aunt, who along with lifeguards, were supervis-
ing deceased before drowning).
22. See, e.g., Univ. Preparatory Sch. v. Huitt, 941 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex. App.
1996) (affirming school's negligent pool area supervision led to student falling
from balcony and sustaining severe injuries).
23. See, e.g., Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 872 P.2d 782, 784-85 (Mont. 1994) (discuss-
ing facts leading to plaintiff's lawsuit).
24. See, e.g., Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 787 P.2d 1159, 1160-64 (Idaho 1990)
(detailing facts and finding no cause of action against provider for accident).
Plaintiff Christopher Northcutt "struck a signpost at the confluence of several ski
runs..." Id. at 1160.
25. See, e.g., De Lacy v. Catamount Dev. Corp., 755 N.Y.S.2d 484, 485 (App.
Div. 2003) (affirming denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment be-
cause question of fact regarding existence of plaintiffs full appreciation of risk).
26. See id. at 485 (concluding that seven-year-old child cannot fully appreciate
risks of chair lift as matter of law).
27. See id.
5
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the safety bar prematurely. 28 Rather than accepting responsibility,
the child and her mother sued the ski operator. They argued that
the operator had not given sufficient instructions on how to use the
chairlift.29 On appeal, the court questioned whether a seven-year-
old novice skier could have "fully appreciated the risks associated
with the use of the chairlift .... ",30 Because the skier may not have
appreciated the risks, the court decided that the seven-year-old
plaintiff could not have assumed liability for the risks as a matter of
law.3 1 Thus, the court heard the plaintiffs' case.
Where should the responsibility line be drawn? Until a certain
age, every child is too young to appreciate the risks of an activity. 32
Does this mean that owners of facilities providing activities have to
insure children for their resulting injuries?3 3 People should be ex-
pected to use care in keeping themselves safe. For some accidents,
people must accept responsibility for their injuries. Although it is
difficult to sort out who caused a sport injury, it may be possible to
allocate responsibility for some types of injuries to participants
rather than placing liability on providers.3 4
II. EXPECTATION THAT INJURED PERSONS SHOULD SUE
AND FEAR OF BEING SUED
American tort law has changed considerably in the past one
hundred years. 35  Motorized transport, dangerous equipment,
chemicals, the "impersonal nature of medical service," the mass
28. See id.
29. See id. The plaintiffs also presented expert evidence "faulting the safety of
the chairlift design for use by children." Id. at 485-86.
30. De Lacy, 755 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
31. See id. (indicating reasoning for denial of summary judgment motion).
32. Indeed, many states feel minors should be able to bring suits for torts
despite releases signed by their parental guardians. Under decided cases, states
have found that releases for minors are against public policy. Compare Scott v. Pac.
W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 11 (Wash. 1992) ("absent judicial or statutory
authority, parents have no authority to release a cause of action belonging to their
child"), with Joseph H. King, Jr., Exculpatory Agreements for Volunteers in Youth Activi-
ties - The Alternative to "Nerf® " Tiddlywinks, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 683, 685-86 (1992)
(arguing for state legislation allowing exculpatory agreements made on behalf of
minors to bar claims against volunteers and nonprofit organizations).
33. See Robert S. Nelson, Comment, The Theory of the Waiver Scale: An Argument
Why Parents Should Be Able to Waive Their Children's Tort Liability Claims, 36 U.S.F. L.
REv. 535, 555 (2002) (observing that nonenforcement of parental waivers results
in higher insurance premiums for activity providers).
34. See, e.g., Noreen L. Slank, Leveling the Playing Field, 38 WASHBUR.N L.J. 847,
860 (1999) (observing that ski and equine statutes, for example, allocate responsi-
bility on both participant and operator).
35. See William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MIcH. L. REv. 465, 475-84
(1953) (discussing apportionment of damages that would occur under compara-
[Vol. 13: p. 37
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production and distribution of goods, and participation in sport ac-
tivities have justified the development of new laws for accidents.3 6
Rule modifications concerning the burden of proof, strict liability,
products liability, and assignment of damages have altered the legal
system to allow more recoveries.3 7 Major changes in tort law have
responded to a belief that compensation should be paid to addi-
tional categories of injured victims. 3 8
One major change has been the near universal rejection of
contributory negligence. 39 Fifty years ago, victims who failed to use
due care were generally precluded from maintaining a negligence
lawsuit. Consequently, many injuries went uncompensated. 40 De-
spite evidence showing the defendant's offensive conduct caused
the injuries, the plaintiffs contributory negligence prevented recov-
ery.4 1 Harsh results under a contributory negligence standard have
caused states to revise their negligence rules and adopt comparative
negligence. 42 Today, victims who were partially at fault for an acci-
tive negligence); Sugarman, supra note 16, at 2406 (describing forces driving tort
law changes).
36. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol, Creative Uncertainty, 81 TEX. L. REV. 627, 641
(2002) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY (2002)) (observing "automobile, the increasingly impersonal nature of medi-
cal service, and the mass manufacture and distribution of goods" have contributed
to development of modem law of torts).
37. But see George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REV.
1, 7 (1987) [hereinafter Priest, Modern] (attributing expansion of liability for acci-
dents to product and service providers' superior position to prevent accidents).
38. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical His-
tory of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 462
(1985) (noting obsolescence of contract law and rise of product liability law to
respond to product-related injuries).
39. See, e.g., Stuart Low & Janet Kiholm Smith, Decisions to Retain Attorneys and
File Lawsuits: An Examination of the Comparative Negligence Rule in Accident Law, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 535, 535-36 (1995) (stating most states have replaced contributory
negligence with comparative negligence).
40. See Wes Parsons, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE L.J. 862, 884 (1983)
(explaining how contributory negligence encouraged injurers to minimize acci-
dent prevention costs); Daniel Voelker, Note, The Application of Comparative Negli-
gence to Strict Products Liability: Coney v.J.L.G. Industries, Inc., 59 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.
1043, 1046 (1983) (observing contributory negligence left many injured plaintiffs
uncompensated).
41. See, e.g., Diederich v. Walters, 357 N.E.2d 1128, 1132 (IlI. 1976) (finding
defendant operating motor vehicle in excess of posted speed limit and failing to
maintain proper lookout for pedestrians lawfully upon highway could not incur
liability because of decedent's contributory negligence).
42. See, e.g.,John C. Moorhouse et al., Law &Economics and Tort Law: A Survey
of Scholarly Opinion, 62 ALB. L. REV. 667, 673-74 (1998) (describing change from
contributory to comparative negligence as "sweeping"); ChristopherJ. Robinette &
Paul G. Sherland, Contributory or Comparative: Which is the Optimal Negligence Rule?,
24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 41, 50-51 (2003) (asserting advantage of comparative negli-
gence over contributory negligence regarding compensation).
7
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dent may sue. The relative fault of the plaintiff and defendant are
compared. Plaintiffs can be awarded damages whenever the trier of
fact concludes that a defendant's action (or inaction) contributed
to the injuries. Moreover, the assumption of risk defense has been
relaxed to permit more lawsuits. 43 These changes have resulted in
greater numbers of injured plaintiffs initiating lawsuits. 4 4
Another change involves people being less likely to accept mis-
fortune. 45 Instead, they seek to blame another person for their in-
juries. Advertisements tout the need to call a doctor or a lawyer if a
person was in an automobile accident, even if they were not in-
jured.46 The ads' purpose is to have someone else pay for the medi-
cal expenses. Friends and neighbors sue each other.47 Others seek
revenge through lawsuits. 48 American culture seems to equate the
failure to bring a lawsuit with forgoing justice and money.
Kim v. Mirisis, a case involving a three-year-old child who ran
out into a street, illustrates this attitude. 49 According to two non-
party eyewitnesses, the child was injured after running between two
parked cars and colliding with the passenger side of a truck.50 The
eyewitnesses' deposition testimony stated the "truck had stopped
before the child collided with it."51 This evidence seems to indicate
43. See, e.g., Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 872 P.2d 782, 790 (Mont. 1994) (noting
assumption of risk was no longer separate affirmative defense in negligence
claims); see also Sugarman, supra note 16, at 2409 (recognizing assumption of risk
doctrine is not as rigorously applied as in 1900).
44. Indeed, some say that the U.S. legal system's set of structures, rules, and
practices encourages adversarial litigation. See Robert A. Kagan, On Surveying the
Whole Legal Forest, 28 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 833, 839 (2003) (describing results of
comparative policy-specific studies indicating litigiousness in United States).
45. See Sugarman, supra note 16, at 2409 (noting misfortune used to be "more
accepted part of life," but now "people are more likely to blame others for their
injuries and go to court to obtain redress").
46. For further discussion on advertising in the legal profession, see Matthew
Garner Mercer, Lawyer Advertising on the Internet: Why the ABA 's Proposed Revisions to
the Advertising Rules Replace the Flat Tire with a Square Wheel, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 713, 714
(2001) (discussing how free speech rules contributed to changes in lawyer
advertising).
47. See Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take a Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restric-
tiveness and the Demise of Community, 47 VILL. L. REv. 553, 573-75 (2002) (stating
how "neighbors are turning on each other").
48. See Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1387,
1403-04 (2003) (suggesting revenge may be aspect of compensation).
49. See Kim v. Mirisis, 730 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (App. Div. 2001) (holding plain-
tiffs did not raise triable issue of fact).
50. See id. (restating facts of case).
51. Id. (noting defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judg-
ment as matter of law by relying on eyewitness testimony).
[Vol. 13: p. 37
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the child was at fault; he should not have run into the street.52 Yet
the severity of the child's injury made his parents feel that the truck
driver was at fault.53 Although the parents had not seen the acci-
dent, they alleged that the driver must have been operating the
truck in a negligent manner.54 They alleged that the driver failed
to see their child in time to avoid the accident due to the driver's
negligence. 55 The parents' grief and their insistence that someone
else be blamed for the accident forced the innocent truck driver to
defend himself before a trial and appellate court before the case
was over.
56
A fear of being sued permeates Americans' daily lives.57 The
endorsement of a tort system that emphasizes individual rights has
eroded the freedom to make choices based on common sense. 58
Manufacturers do not dare sell products that might be misused or
that careless people might utilize incorrectly.59 Businesses select lo-
cations for facilities based on liability law. 60 Schools forgo new ac-
tivities or even cancel longstanding practices due to liability
52. See id. (noting defendant stopped truck "in response to a warning from a
pedestrian who ran into the street in front of the truck").
53. See id. (stating plaintiff's allegation that severity of child's injury estab-
lishes truck's failure to stop at time of accident).
54. See Kim, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 354 (basing argument on severity of child's
injury).
55. See id. (arguing infant's severe injuries were proof of negligence).
56. See id. (affirming previous court's decision to grant defendant summary
judgment because there was no triable issue of fact).
57. See Knapp v. Hill, 657 N.E.2d 1068, 1073 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (discussing
public policy of granting tort immunity to teachers); see also Kagan, supra note 44,
at 839 (noting that fear of litigation is greater in United States than in other coun-
tries); Robert Heidt, The Avid Sportsman and the Scope for Self-Protection: When Exculpa-
tory Clauses Should Be Enforced, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 381, 430-34 (2004) (summarizing
choices recreational users have in providing activities where persons may be in-
jured, securing insurance, or forgoing activity due to liability concerns). For fur-
ther discussion on how fear of being sued affects Americans' lives, see infra notes
58-63 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15,
2003, at 42-51 (discussing how volunteers are forgoing activities due to concerns
about being sued); King, supra note 32, at 685-86 (advocating protection of volun-
teers and non-profit organization through state legislation enforcing exculpatory
agreements made on behalf of minors).
59. See, e.g., Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice,
42 EMORY LJ. 1, 30 n.90 (1993) (describing incidents of equipment misuse re-
sulted in lawsuits leading well-respected equipment manufacturer to file Chapter
11 bankruptcy).
60. See Deborah L. Rhode, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoric,
Too Little Reform, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 989, 1000 (1998) (reporting "California's
corporate leaders repeatedly single out liability law as the factor most likely to hurt
the state's business climate").
9
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concerns. 6' Governments decline to provide services because of
the costs associated with potential liability. 62 Sport and activity
providers discontinue offering activities. 6 3 Due to litigation con-
cerns, equipment, facilities, and activities that are common in Eu-
rope are not in the United States.
Societies have systems of rules to establish guidelines for per-
sonal conduct.64 Rules also address injustices, 65 compensate victims
of wrongful action, 66 and provide for the systematic resolution of
disputes. 67 While the United States and European countries recog-
nize these guiding principles, they approach them differently. Dis-
similar cultural distinctions or political decisions may explain this
difference. Yet the question remains: Can Americans learn any-
thing from their European cousins? Do Europeans have ap-
proaches to tort law that are superior for handling conflicts?
European parents teach their children how to be careful to avoid
injury. Both children and adults recognize their limitations and
learn to be responsible for avoiding injury while living their lives.
Americans factor in an idea of guaranteed safety despite the exis-
tence of adequate safety warnings. 68 They believe that unnecessa-
rily risky situations should be deterred by placing liability on
manufacturers and providers who fail to use sufficient care.69
61. See W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is
the United States the "Odd Man Out" in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIz. J. INT'L. &
COMP. L. 361, 365 (1999) (citingJAMEs R. FORCIER, JUDICIAL EXCESS: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 86-87 (1994)) (discussing school cancel-
lation of extracurricular activities due to liability concerns).
62. See, e.g., Breaux v. Miami Beach, 899 So. 2d 1059, 1074 (Fla. 2005) (Wells,
J., dissenting) (noting increasing of municipality's liability will "predictably result"
in reduction of public services).
63. See, e.g., Heidt, supra note 57, at 412-36 (discussing liability concerns can
lead to certain activities' elimination).
64. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (rejecting Fourteenth
Amendment as "font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may
already be administered ...").
65. See Celia Wells et al., Disasters: A Challengefor the Law, 39 WASHBURN L.J.
496, 522 (2000) (indicating utilitarian theory premised on idea that "tort law exists
to correct injustices").
66. See Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 590 (positing that one justification for tort
law is to compensate wrongful injuries).
67. See Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85
GEO. L.J. 295, 298 (1996) (discussing how mass tort litigation may foster both reso-
lution of private disputes and public concern).
68. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Tex.
1998) (concluding "the mere fact that a product bears an adequate warning does
not conclusively establish that the product is not defective").
69. See, e.g., Proctor v. Davis, 682 N.E.2d 1203, 1214-16 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)
(finding drug manufacturer liable for not adequately warning medical community
members about drug's dangers and risks).
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Americans place duties on manufacturers and providers so that
users and participants do not need to use care. 7°
Drawing upon my experiences abroad, I see advantages to Eu-
ropean approaches to activities. Activity providers can use more
original designs because they have less concern about being sued.
Compared to their American counterparts, European kids enjoy
greatcr challenges on their playgrounds. European public trans-
portation systems can incorporate design features that make them
more user-friendly. Accompanying these features is a requirement
that people use care to keep themselves safe and a liability system
that places responsibilities on the users. American attitudes toward
personal responsibility and expectations concerning safety are pre-
cluding the adoption of technology and design features common in
other parts of the world. 7'
III. CURTAILING LITIGATION
Many policy-driven proposals have been offered to curtail liti-
gation. Some would like to make the American legal system more
uniform, predictable, and fair. 72 Others want to lower transaction
costs and aid the competitiveness of American law firms. 73 Simulta-
neously, the need to encourage research, market new products, and
deter accidents are important.74 The need for tort liability excep-
tions has been recognized for hundreds of years. One of the obvi-
ous exceptions arose from the principle that people should not be
able to sue the king. Under common law, a sovereign immunity
doctrine developed precluding government tort liability. 75 Tort im-
munity for states, agencies, public officials, local governments,
70. See Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 631 n.159 (observing tort law, specifically
under strict liability regimes, seeks to provide people with physical security, but
potentially at expense of others' personal liberty).
71. See Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the
Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM.J. COMP. L. 751, 837-
38 (2003) (distinguishing United States from other countries regarding approach
to products liability). "[The United States] is the only nation where victims sue in
product liability by the tens of thousands every year, where million-dollar awards
are becoming routine, and where punitive damages are a real threat to defend-
ants." Id. at 838.
72. See DeborahJ. La Fetra, Freedom, Responsibility, and Risk: Fundamental Princi-
ples Supporting Tort Reform, 36 IND. L. REv. 645, 683 (2003) (observing tort reform
measures are designed to make legal systems more uniform and predictable).
73. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW' (2003).
74. See Priest, Modern, supra note 37, at 7 (acknowledging providers of prod-
ucts and services are in best position to prevent some accidents).
75. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Tort Claims Against the State: Georgia's Compensation
System, 32 GA. L. REv. 1103, 1135-36 (1998) (discussing language and policy behind
Georgia's sovereign immunity waiver).
11
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school districts, and other governmental entities has developed into
a confusing set of rules created by legislative action and judicial
precedents. 7
6
Other historic immunity principles are part of common law
and have been expanded by state statutes. Good Samaritan laws
allow persons to assist others without incurring liability for mistakes
that may injure the victim being helped. 77 Gleaning laws protect
food donors and other items from liability. 78 Furthermore, during
the past twenty years, citizens and interest groups have petitioned
state legislatures for new legislation regarding equestrian and sport
activities. 79 They sought immunity from accidents involving inher-
ent risks. Some laws responded to an insurance crisis when busi-
nesses were unable to secure liability insurance at reasonable
prices. 80 Other laws were presented as providing economic assis-
tance to a deserving state industry through the reduction of costly
tort lawsuits.81
In the late 1980s, individual state legislatures started consider-
ing new sets of liability rules for equestrian activities.8 2 The negli-
gence immunity provided by the Good Samaritan, gleaning, and
recreational use statutes fostered a special exception for equestrian
activities. 83 Ski operators and purveyors of other sport activities also
76. See, e.g., Thomas A. Bustin & William N. Drake, Jr., Judicial Tort Reform:
Transforming Florida's Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Statute, 32 STETSON L. REv. 469,
469-70 (2003) (stating how confusing Florida's sovereign immunity has become
due to statutory and judicial developments).
77. See generally Danny R. Veilleux, Construction and Application of "Good Samari-
tan" Statutes, 68 A.L.R. 4TH 294 (1989) (analyzing "Good Samaritan" statutes in
different jurisdictions).
78. See, e.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.35-.38 (West 2004) (outlining civil
immunity for gleaning, perishable food donation, and volunteering at non-profit
organizations).
79. See Centner, Tort Liability, supra note 10, at 2 (discussing state sport immu-
nity statutes immunizing sport providers from liability for participants' injuries).
80. See Kathy Bagley, Senior Underwriter, NAHA Ins. Programs, Safety Pro-
grams: The Financial Impact on Insurance, Keynote Address at the American
Horse Council Convention (1992), in N. AM. HORSEMEN'S ASS'N 1993 Y.B. NEWS,
1993, at 8-9 (discussing safety programs and financial impact on insurance);
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE LJ.
1521, 1522 (1987) (noting some commentators interpret decline in complaints
demonstrates "insurance crisis has subsided").
81. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-20-101 (2000) (limiting liabilities for eques-
trian activities in order to encourage personal and economic benefits from such
activities).
82. See Terence J. Centner, The New Equine Liability Statutes, 62 TENN. L. REv.
997, 999-1000 (1995) (classifying numerous state equestrian liability statutes and
recognizing Washington as "first state to enact statutory provisions in 1989").
83. See id. at 1000-01 (explaining purpose of expanding qualified immunity in
equine activities).
[Vol. 13: p. 37
12
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol13/iss1/1
2006] EQUESTRIAN IMMUNITY AND SPORT RESPONSIBILITY 49
petitioned legislatures for immunity exceptions.8 4 Subsequently,
other sport activities that are accompanied by participant accidents
have sought legislative exemptions. Many state legislatures enacted
the following two groups of diverse statutes: (1) equestrian immu-
nity statutes85 and (2) sport responsibility statutes.86 The statutes
describe circumstances which excuse activities providers from in-
curring certain types of accident liability.
A. Equestrian Immunity Statutes
The immunity provided by the Good Samaritan statutes was
the model for the new legislation. In over two decades, more than
forty states enacted immunity provisions for qualifying persons asso-
ciated with equestrian activities.8 7 The most significant distinction
between the equestrian statutes and previous immunity provisions is
that the equestrian statutes are clearly available for commercial
businesses.8 8 Persons who qualify for immunity from injuries in-
volving horses are quite unlike physicians, volunteer firemen, po-
licemen, veterinarians, or donors of recreational property.89 The
equestrian immunity statutes do not adopt qualifications that there
be a donation of services benefiting members of the public. In-
stead, they incorporate limitations whereby the immunity is re-
stricted to a narrow set of accidents involving inherent risks.90
Jones v. Walker, a case involving a horse show accident, illus-
trates frustrations about lawsuits against individuals who were not at
fault.9 1 A horse, owned by Mrs. Walker, but ridden by a business
associate, collided with another horse and rider in a crowded warm-
84. See Centner, Tort Liability, supra note 10, at 25-27 (noting statutory immu-
nity precluded courts from imposing liability on ski operators in certain cases).
85. See infra Table 1 (listing equestrian immunity statutes of 44 states).
86. See infra Table 2 (listing sport responsibility statutes of 35 states).
87. See infra Table 1 (listing equestrian immunity statutes). Moreover, in
other states, precedence may mean that participants in equestrian activities cannot
maintain a negligence lawsuit regarding activities involving inherent risks. See, e.g.,
Guido v. Koopman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 440 (Ct. App. 1991) (following California
case law establishing certain injuries from horseback riding as inherent risks of
activity).
88. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 4-12-2(5)-(6) (West 1995) (including activities
conducted for both profit and non-profit and further defining "equine
professional").
89. Most statutes involve either an act of volunteerism without pay or employ-
ment for a public entity.
90. See, e.g., Chadwick v. Colt Ross Outfitters, Inc., 100 P.3d 465, 468 (Colo.
2004) (noting Colorado statute exempted equine professionals from participants'
injuries resulting from activity's inherent risks).
91. SeeJones v. Walker, 433 S.E.2d 726, 727 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (outlining
facts of case).
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up ring.92 At the time of the mishap, Warmington, Mrs. Walker's
business associate and an experienced horsewoman, exercised com-
plete control over the horse. 93 Nevertheless, the parents of the in-
jured plaintiff felt that the Walkers should incur liability.94 They
felt Mrs. Walker, as owner of the horse, should have realized the
conditions of the warmup ring were dangerous and removed her
horse from the ring.95 Despite Mrs. Walker's lack of control over
her horse and the resulting accident, the Georgia Court of Appeals
decided there was a question of fact regarding Mrs. Walker's negli-
gence in "allowing her horse to continue participating in the horse
show."96 While Mrs. Walker did not control the horse's actions in
the warmup ring, the court decided she could have removed the
horse and rider to avoid the accident.97
The equestrian immunity statutes show a variety of options for
defining persons that may qualify for immunity from liability. 98 A
majority of the statutes set forth a rule whereby qualifying persons
are not liable for an injury of a participant resulting from the inher-
ent risks of equestrian activities. 99 "Inherent risks" are dangers or
conditions that are an integral part of equestrian activities includ-
ing animal behavior, unpredictability of reactions, hazards such as
surface and subsurface conditions, and collisions with other horses
and objects. 100 The altered standard of conduct set forth in the
statutes is similar to the directives of Good Samaritan statutes. 0 1
92. See id. (acknowledging Mrs. Walker allowed her business associate to ride
horse).
93. See id.
94. See id. ("The amended complaint further alleged that Mr. Walker was vi-
cariously liable for the direct negligence of Mrs. Walker.").
95. See id. ("Appellants amended their compliant to allege direct negligence
on the part of Mrs. Walker in allowing her horse to participate in the horse show
under dangerous conditions.").
96. Jones, 433 S.E.2d at 729 (observing Mrs. Walker knew about horses, horse
shows, and this particular warmup ring).
97. See id. (holding "summary judgment was not appropriate").
98. See Krystyna M. Carmel, Comment, The Equine Activity Liability Acts: A Dis-
cussion of Those in Existence and Suggestions for a Model Act, 83 Ky. L.J. 157, 171-79
(1995) (analyzing then-newly adopted legislation enacted to protect equine
professionals).
99. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-20-103 (2000) (stating qualifying persons
"shall not be liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from the
inherent risks of equine activities").
100. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWs §§ 691.1661-.1667 (2000) (limiting equine
professional's liability for activity's inherent risks and including examples of inher-
ent risks).
101. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.37(b)(lg) (West 2004) (protecting quali-
fying persons acting in good faith for damages resulting from act or omission).
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The immunity is limited by the requirement that the injury result
from an inherent risk.
1. A General Standard of Care
Most statutes establish a general standard of care for providers.
Persons who commit an act or omission that constitutes a "willful or
wanton disregard for the safety of the [participant]" remain liable
for their actions.102 Under this general standard, qualifying spon-
sors, employees, and other participants have immunity for conduct
involving negligent and grossly negligent acts when they involve an
inherent risk.103 Furthermore, negligence and gross negligence are
something less than willfulness and should not be punished as
wilfullness. 10 4
The Georgia Court of Appeals considered the meaning of
Georgia's equestrian immunity in Muller v. English.10 5 Mr. Muller's
horse injured an experienced rider when it "suddenly and without
warning, kicked [the rider's] leg."' 0 6 The plaintiff claimed the
horse was a habitual kicker and should have been marked with a
red ribbon on its tail to denote an "irritable horse."10 7 Additional
allegations described Mr. Muller's horse as "vicious . . . with a
known propensity to kick in a fox hunt."'0 The plaintiff con-
tended these arguments established a willful disregard of her
safety. 109
102. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.481(3) (d) (West 2005). This Wisconsin statute
provides common civil liability exemption language. See id.
103. See Terence J. Centner, Modifying Negligence Law for Equine Activities: A
New Good Samaritan Paradigm for Equine Activity Sponsors, 50 ARK. L. REv. 637, 659-60
(1998) (describing Arkansas statute as "a creative approach" that offers protection
for gross negligence in "qualifying situations").
104. See Alpha Zeta Chapter of Pi Kappa Alpha Fraternity v. Sullivan, 740
S.W.2d 127, 132 (Ark. 1987) (examining negligence, gross negligence, and willful-
ness in context of punitive damages). "Negligence alone, however gross, is not
enough to sustain punitive damages." Id.
105. 472 S.E.2d 448, 450 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
106. Id.
107. See id. at 454 (rejecting argument that failure to mark horse with red
ribbon demonstrated willful and wanton conduct). There was no agreement, how-
ever, as to the precise meaning of a red ribbon. See id. English noted that a red
ribbon did not necessarily identify a horse as a kicker. See id. Instead, it could
mean the horse was inexperienced or that the horse may "buck or strike out." Id.
108. Id. at 452 (describing plaintiff's argument that owners of land were negli-
gent). Plaintiff argued Muller's horse was a "dangerous latent condition" because
it was a "vicious animal 'permitted ... by careless management."' Id. The court
dispensed with this argument through an analysis of the pertinent statutory defini-
tions. See id. (excluding injuries resulting from animal's unpredictable behavior
and labeling injuries as inherent risks).
109. See id.
15
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The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the
provisions of the Georgia Equestrian Immunity Statute.110 They ar-
gued the statutory immunity precluded liability.' 1 In agreeing with
the defendants, the appellate court considered the issue of whether
the plaintiffs allegations could establish liability under the general
standard of care. 112 This question concerned whether Mr. Muller
committed an act or omission that constituted a willful disregard
for the plaintiffs safety. 1 3 Case law interpretations of other stat-
utes and common law revealed that willful conduct requires actual
intent to do harm or inflict injury. 114 Willful conduct must be so
reckless or so indifferent to the consequences to be equivalent to
actual intent.15 Given the plaintiffs experience with horses and
the nature of the equestrian activity, the conduct of Mr. Muller's
horse was ordinary animal behavior.116
The general standard of conduct provided by an equestrian im-
munity statute is significant because profitable equestrian busi-
nesses are afforded greater protection against liability than Good
Samaritans. The divergent results are due to policy considerations
and distinctions between the activities. A sponsor engaged in a
profit-making business activity can escape liability for gross negli-
gence involving the inherent risks of equestrian activities, but a
Good Samaritan physician, who is grossly negligent in attempting to
rescue an unfortunate accident victim, does not qualify for immu-
110. See Muller, 472 S.E.2d at 450 (noting defendants moved for summary
judgment after asserting GA. CODE ANN. § 4-12-3(b) (3) (1995) as their affirmative
defense).
111. See id. (focusing dispute on whether defendants satisfied certain condi-
tions precedent to statute or were liable under statutory exception).
112. See id. at 452 (analyzing GA. CODE ANN. § 4-12-3(b) (3) (1995)).
113. See id. ("We disagree, because English has failed to present evidence that
the horse's conduct was anything other than ordinary equine behavior, at least in
the context of fox hunting.").
114. See McNeal Loftis, Inc. v. Helmey, 462 S.E.2d 789, 790 (Ga. Ct. App.
1995) ("[D]emonstration of mere negligence is not sufficient to show willful or
wanton behavior."). The court required demonstration of "willful intention to in-
flict the injury." Id.
115. See Muller, 472 S.E.2d at 452-53 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 450
S.E.2d 208, 212 (Ga. 1994)). The court differentiates "willful" and "wanton" con-
duct: "[w]ilful [sic] conduct is based on an actual intention to do harm or inflict
injury; wanton conduct is that which is so reckless or so charged with indifference
to the consequences as to be the equivalent in spirit to actual intent." Id. (quoting
Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 450 S.E.2d 208, 212 (Ga. 1994)).
116. See id. at 452-54 (analyzing facts to determine if horse's kick was ordi-
nary). The court recognized there could be "an inference of wilful [sic] and wan-
ton disregard in a less openly hazardous equine activity, e.g., a horse used by or
near small children or novice riders." Id. at 452 n.6.
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nity. t" 7 Moreover, a physician on call remains liable for ordinary
negligence. 818
2. A Suitability Exception
The enumerated general standard of conduct of the eques-
trian immunity statutes does not always excuse ncgliigcnce. Where
an injured plaintiff has rented a horse for a trail ride or other activ-
ity, the general standard evaluated in the Muller case is usually su-
perseded by a suitability exception. 119 Under the suitability
exception, persons providing horses to others must exercise "rea-
sonable and prudent efforts" to avoid liability.120 The suitability ex-
ception enables a plaintiff-participant to maintain an action against
a defendant-provider of an animal if the defendant (1) failed to
assess the participant's ability, (2) negligently evaluated equipment
and activity, or (3) intentionally injured plaintiff.'2 '
To avoid liability for failing to assess a participant's ability, the
horse provider must make an inquiry of the participant's readiness
to engage in the activity. 122 An allegation that the defendant-pro-
vider failed to employ reasonable efforts to inquire into the partici-
pant's ability to engage safely in equestrian activities raises a triable
117. See Rodriguez v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 505 N.Y.S.2d 345,
347 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (protecting physician from liability under Good Samaritan
Law unless physician was grossly negligent).
118. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29 (2005) (applying Good Samaritan statute to
physicians providing "emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency
.... .).
119. See id. §§ 4-12-3(b)(1) - (b)(4) (1995) (enumerating exceptions to
equine activity immunity).
120. See id. §§ 4-12-3(b) (1) (A) - (b) (1) (B) (describing necessary conduct by
equine professional). The equine professional or sponsor employee must have:
(1) (A) Provided the equipment or tack, and knew or should have known
that the equipment or tack was faulty, and such equipment or tack was
faulty to the extent that it did cause the injury.
(B) Provided the animal and failed to make reasonable and prudent ef-
forts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the
equine activity or llama activity and to safely manage the particular
animal based on the participant's representations of his or her ability.
Id. Persons remain subject to liability if they "[p]rovided the equine and failed to
make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to
engage safely in the equine activity and determine the ability of the participant to
manage safely the particular equine based on the participant's representations of
his or her ability." 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/20(b) (2) (2002).
121. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 4-12-3(b) (1) - (b)(4) (1995) (eliminating defen-
dant-provider's immunity under enumerated circumstances).
122. See id. § 4-12-3(b) (1) (B) (lifting immunity when activity provider fails to
make "reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to
engage safely in the [activity] ...").
17
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issue. 123 This suggests that a tactfully drafted argument can estab-
lish a case leading to a jury.
Mercer v. Fritts illustrates the assessment of the participant's
ability and the meaning of this suitability exception. 12 4 Elden and
Betty Fritts owned horses and invited a friend, Renee Mercer, to
their farm to ride their stallion. 125 While Mercer was riding the
stallion, she suddenly encountered the defendants' mare.1 2 6 The
stallion bucked and fell backwards injuring Mercer. 127 Mercer sued
the Fritts arguing they had not inquired about her ability to ride a
stallion in proximity of a mare nor advised her that one of them
would be riding the mare while she rode the stallion. 128 The court
found that this evidence presented an issue under Kansas injury-by-
animal law. 129 Beneath Mercer's allegations, an issue existed as to
whether the Fritts had made sufficient efforts to inquire about Mer-
cer's ability to handle the stallion.130 Given this evidence, the Kan-
sas Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the lower court to
resolve the liability issue. 13 1 If these facts were considered under an
equestrian immunity statute, the court would reach the same re-
123. See, e.g., Fielder v. Academy Riding Stables, 49 P.3d 349, 352 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2002) (finding defendant had matched plaintiff with suitable horse but may
have failed to ascertain ability of plaintiff to ride horse).
124. See Mercer v. Fritts, 676 P.2d 150 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984). Mercer did not
involve an equestrian liability statute.
125. See id. at 151 (stating Mercer accepted Elden Fritts's invitation to ride his
horse). Mercer also told him that she was an experienced rider. See id.
126. See id. (stating Mercer encountered mare when she was returning to barn
after riding stallion). Fritts did not tell Mercer that he planned to ride the mare.
See id.
127. See id. (recalling Mercer's injuries as ruptured diaphragm, collapsed
lung, and pelvis and lumbar vertebrae fractures).
128. See id. (summarizing facts of case).
129. See Mercer, 676 P.2d at 154 (comparing current case with previous cases
applying injury-by-animal law). The court opined:
[I]f both animal and premises defects are involved in a case, the law to be
applied depends upon which of the two causal factors is more significant.
In our present case, the only alleged fault relates to acts and omissions on
[the defendant's] part pertaining to the horses, not to the premises.
Id.
130. See id. at 153 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 509(1) (1976)
(concerning possessor's knowledge of domestic animal)). The court noted that
under injury-by-animal law, the defendant horse keeper may be held liable for
injury caused by a horse if the defendant knew the horse was unsafe and "the
plaintiff did not possess sufficient experience to be permitted to ride the horse."
Id. (citations omitted).
131. See id. at 154 (reversing lower court's grant of summaryjudgment). The
court held that the facts "presented a factfinder's question as to defendants' negli-
gence in their control of the stallion and showed no connection between the in-
jury and any condition of the premises, it was error to grant summaryjudgment for
the defendants." Id.
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sult.13 2 The trier of fact would need to determine whether the pro-
vider of the horse had adequately assessed the suitability of the
animal for the rider.
Furthermore, the suitability exception examines whether the
provider negligently failed to use the information gained through
an inquiry to determine the participant's ability to engage safely in
the equestrian activity. The facts from Tan v. Goddard133 show how
the suitability exception rationale might defeat the equestrian im-
munity statute.134 The plaintiff was enrolled in a training school to
learn how to be ajockey.135 One day he was given a mount, saddle
horse, that had an injured foot. The plaintiff reported to the
trainer that the mount was not walking or behaving normally. 3 6
Despite these facts, the trainer instructed the plaintiff to ride the
mount and the mount fell, injuring the plaintiff.13 7 This testimony
supported an allegation that the defendants had breached a
duty.138 By instructing the plaintiff to ride an injured horse, the
defendants had not selected a safe activity. 139 An equestrian immu-
nity statute also would not preclude this liability.
A third suitability exception involves the provider's failure to
determine the participant's ability to safely manage the selected
horse.' 40 In Shandy v. Sombrero Ranches, Inc., Shandy told a defen-
dant's wrangler (or agent) that he was a beginner rider.' 4 ' During
preparations for a horseback ride, Shandy experienced difficulty in
controlling the horse. 142 The defendant's agent did not come to
Shandy's assistance and the horse bolted, throwing the plaintiff to
132. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4003(a) (1) (B) (2005).
133. 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89 (Ct. App. 1993).
134. See id. at 93 (noting defendants' liability was based on respondeat supe-
rior theory). Tan did not involve an equestrian liability statute.
135. See id. at 90 (noting plaintiff had "no-experience or knowledge about
riding horses").
136. See id. (restating facts).
137. See id. (noting plaintiff was instructed to ride horse easily "to see how it
was").
138. See Tan, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93 (applying precedents holding that instruc-
tors owe "duty of due care to persons in their charge").
139. See id. (noting defendants' responsibility for plaintiffs injury).
140. See, e.g., TEX. CIv. PRIc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 87.004(2) (Vernon 2005)
(lifting immunity if equine provider failed to determine participant's "ability to
safely manage the equine").
141. See Shandy v. Sombrero Ranches, Inc., 525 P.2d 487, 487 (Colo. Ct. App.
1974). Shandy did not involve an equestrian liability statute.
142. See id. at 487-88 (relying on witness's testimony that plaintiff might have
needed some measures in controlling horse).
19
Centner: Equestrian Immunity and Sport Responsibility Statutes: Altering O
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
56 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOURNAL
the ground. 143 The expert testimony suggested that defendant's
agent might have known that the horse provided to Shandy was not
suitable. 144 The agent was negligent in failing to take timely action
to assist the plaintiff in achieving control of the horse. If this case
was to be decided under the subsequently adopted Colorado Immu-
nity Statute, 145 sufficient evidence showed negligence in defen-
dant's failure to determine Shandy's ability to manage the selected
horse. 146 Therefore, an equestrian immunity statute would not
shield the defendant from liability.
These cases show that recreational horseback riding activities
involving horse rentals present injured riders with the opportunity
of alleging facts that establish a liability issue. If plaintiffs allege
facts within one of these categories of exceptions, they frustrate the
immunity provided by the equestrian immunity statutes. The de-
fendant provider may argue different facts, but the plaintiff's allega-
tions that the provider of the horse did not reasonably choose an
animal suited for the rider presents a triable issue of fact. The trier
of fact will need to determine which version of facts is most
credible.
B. Sport Responsibility Statutes
More than fifty specialized "sport responsibility statutes" re-
garding skiing, roller skating, snowmobiling, sport shooting, outfit-
ters and guides, and other risky sport activities have been
enacted. 14 7 Providers of risky sport activities have garnered legisla-
tive dispensation that changes tort rules for accidents involving the
inherent risks of the sport.148 Participants assume responsibility for
obvious and necessary dangers. This is similar to the doctrine of
primary assumption of risk that exists in some states, including Cali-
143. See id. at 488 (stating plaintiff suffered serious injuries when horse threw
him).
144. See id. (analyzing plaintiffs expert witness testimony).
145. See generally COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-119 (West 2005) (exempting
equine professionals from liability).
146. Compare Shandy, 525 P.2d at 488 (deciding defendant was negligent by
not assisting plaintiff in achieving adequate control of horse), with CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-21-119(4)(b)(1)(B) (requiring provider to determine ability of
participant "to engage safely in the activity").
147. See infra Table 2 (noting state statutory provisions on sport responsi-
bility).
148. See generally Terence J. Centner, Simplifying Sports Liability Law Through a
Shared Responsibility Chapter, 1 VA. SPORTS & ENT. LJ. 54 (2001) (discussing statutes
providing that participants are responsible for accidents involving inherent risks).
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fornia 49 and New York. 150 Operators retain liability for negligence
outside the scope of the statutory protection. 151 These provisions
potentially reduce the number of accidents that will lead to success-
ful lawsuits. 152 In this manner, the statutes help facilitate participa-
tion in risky sport activities.
Sport responsibility statutes employ different directives to re-
duce the liability of sport providers for participants' injuries. Most
statutes delineate a directive preventing participants from recover-
ing damages for injuries resulting from the sport's inherent risks. 153
An alternative directive follows the Good Samaritan model and
grants immunity to qualifying sport providers except those who fail
to comply with duties. 154 Whenever a defendant sport provider
breaches an enumerated duty and a plaintiffs injury is related to
that breached duty, the statutory immunity defense does not ap-
ply.' 55 Another alternative statutory provision involves the assign-
ment of duties to participants. 156 Participants who fail to subscribe
149. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 703-04 (Cal. 1992) (distinguishing be-
tween primary assumption of risk and secondary assumption of risk and barring
plaintiffs' negligence case when defendant has not breached duty); Mastro v. Pe-
trick, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 185, 187 (Ct. App. 2001) (applying primary assumption of
risk to collision between skier and snowboarder and deciding skier assumed risk);
Allen v. Snow Summit, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 818 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting
primary assumption of risk is complete defense against negligence claim for inju-
ries resulting from activity's inherent risk).
150. See Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 968 (N.Y. 1986) (categorizing state's
law pertaining to sporting events as "primary assumption of risk"); Jordan v. Maple
Ski Ridge, Inc., 645 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599-600 (App. Div. 1996) (affirming plaintiff had
assumed inherent risks of skiing).
151. See, e.g., Brett v. Great An. Recreation, Inc., 677 A.2d 705, 717 (N.J.
1996) (finding ski statute did not apply to tobogganers).
152. See Skene v. Fileccia, 539 N.W.2d 531, 534-35 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (ap-
plying Michigan Roller Skating Safety Act ("RSSA") and holding plaintiff accepted
dangers of colliding with other participants in roller rink, thus defendant entitled
to summary disposition), overruled by Dale v. Beta-C, Inc., 574 N.W.2d 697, 701
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (finding holding overbroad but upholding principle "that
collisions among roller skaters are obvious and necessary dangers assumed by a
roller skater pursuant to § 5 of the RSSA").
153. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4171.10 (West 2004) (enacting assump-
tion of risk as complete defense against roller skating rink operators). For further
examples of such statutes, see infra Table 2.
154. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 759.005(a) (Vernon 2003)
(noting operator liability is limited to breach of duty). The relevant provision
reads: "[t]he liability of an operator is limited to those injuries or damages caused
by a breach of the operator's duties prescribed by Section 757.002." Id.
155. See, e.g., Dale, 574 N.W.2d at 702-03 (finding absence of toe stopper on
roller skate might violate duty set forth in Michigan's Roller Skating Safety Act).
For exact statutory language of Michigan's Roller Skating Safety Act, see MICH.
COMP. LAws § 445.1726 (2005).
156. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-31-6-2 (West 1999) (listing duties of roller
skaters).
21
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to the cited duties incur liability for injuries to themselves or to
others. 157 This directive generally codifies the common law as-
sumption of the risk by confirming that participants have a duty to
use care with respect to obvious and necessary risks. 158
1. Duties for Sport Providers
Most sport responsibility statutes prescribe duties for sport
providers. 159 The overall objectives are to clarify obligations and to
encourage efforts to provide safer activities.1 60 The statutes list du-
ties for persons providing property or equipment for sport activities
or contain general language concerning provider obligations. 161 By
157. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 143, § 710 (West 2002). The relevant
provision reads:
A skier skiing down hill shall have the duty to avoid any collision with any
other skier, person or object on the hill below him, and, except as other-
wise provided in this chapter, the responsibility for collisions by any skier
with any other skier or person shall be solely that of the skier or person
involved and not that of the operator....
Id.
158. See id. (delineating responsibilities under ski statute). Specifically, "[a]ny
person skiing on other than an open slope or trail within the ski area shall be
responsible for any injuries resulting from his action." Id.
159. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 759.002 (Vernon 2003) (list-
ing duties of roller-skating centers' operators). The statute reads:
An operator shall:
(1) provide at least one individual to act as a floor guard for approxi-
mately every 200 skaters;
(2) require each floor guard to:
(A) wear attire that identifies the individual as a floor guard;
(B) be on duty at all times while skating is allowed;
(C) direct and supervise skaters and spectators; and
(D) watch for foreign objects that may have fallen on the floor;
(3) inspect and maintain in good condition the roller-skating surface and
the railings, kickboards, and walls surrounding the roller-skating surface;
(4) inspect and maintain in good mechanical condition roller-skating
equipment that the operator leases or rents to roller skaters;
(5) comply with the Roller-Skating Rink Safety Standards, 1980 edition,
published by the Roller Skating Rink Operators Association of America;
(6) post the duties of roller skaters and spectators prescribed by this
chapter in conspicuous places in the roller-skating center; and
(7) maintain the stability and legibility of all required signs, symbols, and
posted notices.
Id.
160. See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 72/5 (West 2002) (intending Roller
Skating Rink Safety Act to make liability "more predictable by limiting the liability
that may be incurred by the owners and encouraging the development and imple-
mentation of risk reduction techniques"). Another motivating factor is roller skat-
ing rinks' "great difficulty in obtaining liability insurance coverage at an affordable
cost." Id.
161. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:144 (West 2005) (listing responsibilities of
roller skating rink operators). The statute reads:
It shall be the responsibility of the operator to the extent practicable to:
[Vol. 13: p. 37
22
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol13/iss1/1
2006] EQUESTRIAN IMMUNITY AND SPORT RESPONSIBILITY 59
enumerating duties for providers, the sport responsibility statute
may impose a duty that increases liability.
162
Perhaps the most significant feature of listed duties in sport
responsibility statutes is that the duty may override the provider's
ability to obtain a liability waiver.1 63 Statutes defining the provider's
continuing duty to ensure participants' safety may preclude releases
of negligence.1 64 Both enumerated and implied duties restrict
commercial recreation providers' available options to reduce
liability.' 65
Murphy v. N. American River Runners, Inc.,166 exemplifies this re-
striction. Plaintiff, Kathleen Murphy, sued for injuries occurring on
a. Post the duties of roller skaters and spectators and the duties, obliga-
tions and liabilities of the operator as prescribed in this act, in conspicu-
ous places in at least three locations in the roller skating rink;
b. Maintain the stability and legibility of all signs, symbols and posted
notices required by this act;
c. When the rink is open for sessions, have at least one floor guard on
duty for every approximately 200 skaters;
d. Maintain the skating surface in reasonably safe condition and clean
and inspect the skating surface before each session;
e. Maintain the railings, kickboards and wall surrounding the skating sur-
face in good condition;
f. In rinks with step-up or step-down skating surfaces, insure that the cov-
ering on the riser is securely fastened;
g. Install fire extinguishers and inspect fire extinguishers at recom-
mended intervals;
h. Provide reasonable security in parking areas during operational hours;
i. Inspect emergency lighting units periodically to insure the lights are in
proper order;
j. Keep exit lights and lights in service areas on when skating surface
lights are turned off during special numbers;
k. Check rental skates on a regular basis to insure the skates are in good
mechanical condition;
1. Prohibit the sale or use of alcoholic beverages on the premises; and
m. Comply with all applicable State and local safety codes.
Id.
162. See Sytner v. New York, 645 N.Y.S.2d 654, 656-57 (App. Div. 1996) (find-
ing failure to warn skiers of bare spots was breach of statutory duty).
163. See Murphy v. N. Am. River Runners, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 504, 512 (W. Va.
1991) (finding statutory duty overrode provisions of waiver); Yauger v. Skiing En-
ters., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60, 65 (Wis. 1996) (finding waiver void as against public
policy).
164. See Murphy, 412 S.E.2d at 512 ("[W]hen a statute imposes a standard of
care, a clause in an agreement purporting to exempt a party from tort liability to a
member of the protected class for failure to conform to that statutory standard is
unenforceable.").
165. See, e.g., Yauger, 557 N.W.2d at 61-62 (continuing plaintiffs' lawsuit be-
cause public policy voided exculpatory contract).
166. 412 S.E.2d 504, 512 (W. Va. 1991) (upholding statutory safety obligation
over private individual's waiver).
23
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a rafting trip. 167 Because Murphy signed a release, the defendant, a
"licensed commercial whitewater outfitter," moved to dismiss the
lawsuit. 168 The outfitter argued the plaintiff had assumed liability
for her injuries. 169 Rafting, however, was an activity governed by
the West Virginia Whitewater Responsibility Act. 170 The West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that the Whitewater Respon-
sibility Act established a standard of care.' 71  Commercial
whitewater guides needed to "conform to the standard of care ex-
pected by members of their profession.' 1 72 Any release to exempt
an outfitter from liability for breach of this duty was unenforce-
able.' 73 Thus, Murphy's release was irrelevant. By arguing that the
defendant's guide failed to conform with the statutory duty of care,
the plaintiff established an issue of material fact. ' 74 The trier of fact
needed to weigh the conflicting evidence.
2. Duties for Sport Participants
Many sport responsibility statutes contain language whereby
sport participants also have duties. 175 These directives encourage
participants to employ appropriate efforts to keep themselves
167. See id. at 507-08 (alleging that defendant's guide "negligently, carelessly
and recklessly" caused her injuries).
168. See id. at 508 n.3 (relying on release language: "I understand and do
hereby agree to assume all of the above risks and other related risks which may be
encountered on said raft trip, including activities preliminary and subsequent
thereto.").
169. See id. at 508 (arguing plaintiff assumed all risks via anticipatory release).
170. See W. VA. CODE §§ 20-3B-1 - 3B-5 (2002) (defining legislative purpose,
commercial whitewater outfitter, participants' duties and liability of commercial
whitewater guides).
171. See Murphy, 412 S.E.2d at 512 (describing standard of care existing de-
spite certain contractual agreements).
172. W. VA. CODE § 20-3B-3(b).
173. See Murphy, 412 S.E.2d at 512 ("[W]hen a statute imposes a standard of
care, a clause in an agreement purporting to exempt a party from tort liability to a
member of the protected class for failure to conform to that statutory standard is
unenforceable.").
174. See id. (concluding trial court "should not have granted the defendant's
motion for summaryjudgment"). Plaintiff's affidavit averred defendant's failure to
"conform to the standard of care expected of members of his occupation" and that
there were "reasonable alternatives" that "would have posed no risk of harm to the
[plaintiff]." Id.
175. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 759.003 (Vernon 2003)
(enumerating roller skaters' duties). In Texas, roller skaters:
(1) shall comply with each posted sign or warning that relates to the be-
havior and responsibility of the roller skater in the roller-skating center;
(2) shall obey instructions given by the operator, floor guard, or other
roller-skating center personnel;
(3) shall maintain reasonable control over the speed and direction of the
roller skater's skating at all times;
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safe. 176 Generally, these statutes require participants to engage in
the sport within the limits of their ability.' 77 Participants also may
have obligations to obey signs and directions.1 78 Courts have inter-
preted this statutory duty to mean that participants are liable for
injuries from obvious and necessary dangers.1 79 By engaging in an
activity, persons accept obvious and necessary dangers. 180 This in-
terpretation determines the presence or absence of a legal duty by
employing an inherent risk analysis. 181 When participants have an
opportunity to avoid injury from obvious dangers, they retain total
responsibility for injuries arising from such dangers. 182
An additional feature of sport responsibility statutes is often a
provision precluding injured participants, and sometimes specta-
tors, from recovering damages. In general, participants cannot re-
cover damages from sport providers for injuries resulting from the
sport's inherent dangers and risks. 183 In a few instances, sport re-
(4) shall be reasonably aware of other roller skaters or objects in the
roller-skating center to avoid colliding with other roller skaters or objects;
(5) shall know the roller skater's ability to control the intended direction
of skating and shall skate within the limits of that ability; and
(6) may not act in a manner that may cause injury to others.
(b) The conduct of a child shall be evaluated based on the child's experi-
ence, intelligence, capacity, and age to determine if the child violated this
section or Section 757.004.
Id.
176. See, e.g., Ansani v. Cascade Mountain, Inc., 588 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1998) (observing that underWis. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.525 (3) - (4) (1998) plain-
tiff had duty to use ordinary care for his own safety and protection).
177. See, e.g., Davis v. Sun Valley Ski Educ. Found., Inc., 941 P.2d 1301, 1305
(Idaho 1997) (citing Idaho Ski Statute expecting skiers to ski within limits of their
ability).
178. See MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 408.342(1) (c) (West 1999) (specifying con-
duct rules skiers must follow); Anderson v. Pine Knob Ski Resort, Inc., 664 N.W.2d
756, 759 (Mich. 2003) (applying statute and requiring skiers to heed signs and
warnings).
179. See, e.g., Anderson, 664 N.W.2d at 759-61 (rejecting negligence lawsuit
when skier ran into visible timing shack resulting in injury); Schmitz v. Cannon-
sburg Skiing Corp., 428 N.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (denying cause
of action where skier fatally collided with lone tree).
180. See, e.g., Schmitz, 428 N.W.2d at 744 (stating that under Michigan Ski Stat-
ute "obvious and necessary" risk involve natural phenomena, natural obstacles, and
types of equipments inherent to ski area).
181. See Catherine Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries and Inherent Risks: Wyo-
ming's Recreational Safety Act-An Update, 33 LAND & WATER L. REv. 249, 276-77
(1998) (noting statute may be written so court can decide whether accident in-
volved inherent risk and not breach of defendant's duty as matter of law).
182. See Ansani v. Cascade Mountain, Inc., 588 N.W.2d 321, 324-25 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1998) (upholding district courtjury instruction to note immediate surround-
ings and dangers which should have been open and obvious to plaintiff).
183. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-44-109(1) (West 2005) ("Each skier
expressly accepts and assumes the risk of and all legal responsibility for any injury
25
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sponsibility statutes provide that spectators also assume inherent
risks.'8 4 When sport participants and spectators assume the sport's
inherent risks, they cannot recover damages for these injuries from
others. 185
Courts have considered a number of ski-injury cases where pre-
trial motions could dismiss lawsuits. For example, in Schaefer v. Mt.
Southington Ski Area, a plaintiff was injured when she hit a rut on the
"Giant Slalom" course. 186 The defendant ski provider argued im-
munity under the provisions of the Connecticut Ski Statute. 187
Under the statute, the plaintiff assumed responsibility for skiing's
inherent hazards.1 88 The statutory description of inherent risks
provided that they included "variations in the terrain of the trail or
slope" and variations in snow conditions. 89 The court found no
issue of fact to be determined. 90 The ski provider was not liable
for the plaintiffs injury because it arose from an inherent risk.' 91
3. Immunity under the Statutes
An additional feature of sport responsibility statutes involves
grants of immunity for sport providers. 192 Statutes commonly grant
activity providers immunity against some sports participants' civil
to person or property resulting from any of the inherent dangers and risks of ski-
ing .... ).
184. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-13 (2004) ("[S]pectators are deemed to
have knowledge of and to assume the inherent risks of roller skating, insofar as
those risks are obvious and necessary.").
185. See Ritchie-Gamester v. City of Berkley, 597 N.W.2d 517, 527 (Mich.
1999) (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate defendant's reckless behavior to defeat
defendant's motion for summary disposition).
186. See Schaefer v. Mt. Southington Ski Area, Inc., No. CV 970340387S, 1997
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2864, at *7 (Conn. App. Ct. Oct. 22, 1997) (stating plaintiff
considered herself "'very close' to being an expert skier").
187. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-212 (West 2003) (listing assumption of
risks of injury by skier).
188. See Schaefer, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2864, at *5-7 (describing how
plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that defendant provider had statutory duty
of care).
189. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-212(1) (noting exception that skiers do not
assume risk of variations caused by operator).
190. See Schaefer, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2864, at *7 (granting summary
judgment in favor of defendant).
191. See id. (holding terrain or snow variation should not cause provider to be
liable because variations are inherent risks of skiing).
192. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-114-107(a) (2001) ("Unless a ski area op-
erator is in violation of this chapter or other state acts pertaining to ski areas,
which violation is causal of the injury complained of, no action shall lie against any
such operator by any skier or passenger or representative thereof. ...).
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actions.' 93 Alternatively, a statute may state that persons providing
sport activities are not liable unless the failure to comply with duties
caused the damage. 194 Under either of these immunity grants,
sport providers can avoid liability for some injuries. The potential
for the sport responsibility statutes to achieve their stated purpose
of reducing the liability of recreational operators may be observed
by examining two cases that considered the Idaho Ski Statute.
In Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., Christopher Northcutt sued the
ski operator for negligently placing a signpost.195 While both plain-
tiff and defendant agreed the ski statute1 96 immunized the defen-
193. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-53 (2005) (stating skiers cannot make
claims against ski area operators for injuries resulting from inherent risks).
194. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 20-3B-5(a) (2002) (containing pertinent statutory
language).
No licensed commercial whitewater outfitter or commercial whitewater
guide acting in the course of his employment is liable to a participant for
damages or injuries to such participant unless such damage or injury was
directly caused by failure of the commercial whitewater outfitter or com-
mercial whitewater guide to comply with duties placed on him ....
Id.
195. See Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 787 P.2d 1159, 1160 (Idaho 1990) (re-
jecting ski operator's liability for "improper placement of a sign erected" to "lessen
the inherent risks in skiing").
196. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1103 (2004) (describing duties of ski area oper-
ators). Statute requires ski operator:
(1) To mark all trail maintenance vehicles and to furnish such vehicles
with flashing or rotating lights which shall be in operation whenever the
vehicles are working or are in movement in the skiing area;
(2) To mark with a visible sign or other warning implement the location
of any hydrant or similar equipment used in snowmaking operations and
located on ski slopes and trails;
(3) To mark conspicuously the top or entrance to each slope or trail or
area, with an appropriate symbol for its relative degree of difficulty; and
those slopes, trails, or areas which are closed, shall be so marked at the
top or entrance;
(4) To maintain one or more trail boards at prominent locations at each
ski area displaying that area's network of ski trails and slopes with each
trail and slope rated thereon as to it [its] relative degree of difficulty;
(5) To designate by trail board or otherwise which trails or slopes are
open or closed;
(6) To place, or cause to be placed, whenever snowgrooming or
snowmaking operations are being undertaken upon any trail or slope
while such trail or slope is open to the public, a conspicuous notice to
that effect at or near the top of such trail or slope;
(7) To post notice of the requirements of this chapter concerning the use
of ski retention devices. This obligation shall be the sole requirement
imposed upon the ski area operator regarding the requirement for or use
of ski retention devices;
(8) To provide a ski patrol with qualifications meeting the standards of
the national ski patrol system;
(9) To post a sign at the bottom of all aerial passenger tramways which
advises the passengers to seek advice if not familiar with riding the aerial
passenger tramway; and
27
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dant from liability from skiing's inherent risks, they disagreed as to
whether an inherent risk caused Northcutt's injuries. 197 Northcutt
had collided with a sign and alleged the construction or placement
of the sign involved negligence. 98 The defendant operator had
placed a sign marking the relative degree of difficulty of the slope
and trails pursuant to a duty specified by the ski statute.1 99 In exam-
ining the Idaho Ski Statute, the Idaho Supreme Court found that
operators have a statutory duty "[n]ot to intentionally or negli-
gently cause injury to any person." 200 However, operators have no
duty with respect to activities undertaken to lessen risks inherent in
the sport of skiing. 20 ' Under the statute, an operator's activities un-
dertaken to reduce risks do not impose on the operator any further
duty to accomplish such activities to any standard of care.20 2 There-
fore, the court dismissed the lawsuit, finding running into the sign-
post an inherent risk, and thus, statutory immunity applied to the
defendant. 203 Because of the immunity provided by the ski statute,
the lawsuit could be dismissed.
In Long v. Bogus Basin Recreational Ass'n, Inc., 204 the Idaho Su-
preme Court again analyzed the Idaho Ski Statute. 20 5 Christopher
Long sued an operator for injuries from a ski accident.20 6 First, he
argued that the defendant operator was negligent by not providing
(10) Not to intentionally or negligently cause injury to any person; pro-
vided, that except for the duties of the operator set forth in subsections
(1) through (9) of this section and in section 6-1104, Idaho Code, the
operator shall have no duty to eliminate, alter, control or lessen the risks
inherent in the sport of skiing, which risks include but are not limited to
those described in section 6-1106, Idaho Code; and, that no activities un-
dertaken by the operator in an attempt to eliminate, alter, control or
lessen such risks shall be deemed to impose on the operator any duty to
accomplish such activities to any standard of care.
Id. §§ 6-1103(1) - 1103(10) (alteration in original).
197. See Northcutt, 787 P.2d at 1161 (restating facts).
198. See id. at 1159-60 (arguing and listing defendant's specific conduct as
negligent).
199. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1103(3) (2004) (requiring ski operator to mark
slope or trail with appropriate difficulty level).
200. Northcutt, 787 P.2d at 1162 (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1103(10)
(1989)) (alteration in original).
201. See id. at 1162-63 (concluding ski operators are not liable for skiing's
inherent risks).
202. See id. at 1163 (discussing overall implications on ski operator's
conduct).
203. See id. (concluding operators are not held to any standard of care in
accidents involving skiing's inherent risks).
204. 869 P.2d 230 (Idaho 1994).
205. SeeIDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 6-1101 to -1109 (2004) (defining skiers' and ski
area operators' responsibilities and liabilities).
206. See Long, 869 P.2d at 231 (stating Long injured his right leg).
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a sign indicating the trail's "relative degree of difficulty. '" 207 The
court decided Long was skiing in an undesignated area so the de-
fendant did not have a duty to mark the area.208 Long then argued
he was not a skier as defined by the statute because he went off the
designated trails. 20 9 The court decided that Long had violated his
statutory duties under the skier statute by going off the marked
trail.2 (1 Holding otherwise would enable skiers to nullify statutory
obligations for participants. 21 The court decided the statute estab-
lished skiers' and ski operators' duties and standards of care.212 In
Long, the operator had not violated any statutory duties while the
injured participant had assumed the risk for his accident by skiing
into an unmarked area.213 Thus, the statute effectively prevented
this errant skier from collecting damages from the operator.
4. Issues to Be Resolved
While sport responsibility statutes were intended to reduce liti-
gation, sometimes they fail to accomplish this objective. Mead v.
M.S.B., Inc. 21 4 discussed whether a plaintiffs injuries caused by ski-
ing's inherent risk could be determined as a matter of law. Plain-
tiff, Zachary Mead, was injured when he came around a right hand
curve on a trail and hit a rocky outcropping. 21 5 The question on
appeal was whether the Montana Skier Responsibility Act 216 pro-
vided the defendant immunity from damages related to Mead's ac-
cident.217  The Montana Supreme Court analyzed the Skier
207. IDAHO CODE § 6-1103(3) (2004).
208. See Long, 869 P.2d at 232-33 (stating ski operators have duty to post signs
on designated trails only). Vertigo Road, where plaintiff was skiing, was not a des-
ignated trail, and thus, the ski operators had no duty to mark it. See id. at 232.
209. See id. at 233 (advancing plaintiff's second argument that Idaho Code
§ 6-1102(6) did not apply because he was "business invitee").
210. See id. at 233 ("Long assumed the risk for his own accident, when he
skied into an unmarked area."). Long was a skier. The statute reads: " 'Skier'
means any person present at a skiing area under the control of a ski area operator
for the purpose of engaging in the sport of skiing by utilizing the ski slopes and
trails and does not include the use of an aerial passenger tramway." IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 6-1102(6) (2005).
211. See Long, 869 P.2d at 233 (responding to Long's argument that operator
owed higher standard of care to skiers who go off designated trails).
212. See id. (rejecting Long's argument and holding skier statute established
duties and standards of care).
213. See id. (summarizing facts and court's decision).
214. 872 P.2d 782 (Mont. 1994).
215. See id. at 784 (describing accident's details).
216. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-736(4) (2003) (detailing specific examples
of inherent risks).
217. See Mead, 872 P.2d at 788 (rejecting defendant's argument that its duties
were limited to those listed in Montana Skier Responsibility Act).
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Responsibility Act's provisions describing inherent risks for which
the plaintiff had to accept responsibility. 21 8 If all of the evidence
proved Mead was responsible for his accident according to the stat-
utory provisions, the case could be dismissed. 219
The court also addressed the defendant's argument that skiers
accepted injuries arising from variations in skiing terrain involving
snow and ice conditions.220 The facts conclusively demonstrated
that a rocky outcrop from a vertical surface injured Mead.221 This
meant that the defense concerning acceptance of variations in ter-
rain did not apply. The second consideration was the rocky out-
cropping. 222 Was this outcropping within the statutory definition
of a bare spot? The court decided the evidence did not prove as a
matter of law whether the outcropping should have been covered
with snow or was a bare spot.223 In the absence of such evidence,
the court could not determine whether Mead had assumed respon-
sibility for the accident.224 A third issue involved the absence of
conclusive proof that Mead skied beyond the boundaries of the
trail.2 25 Given the contradictory facts, a fact-finder needed to de-
cide.whether inherent risks caused Mead's injury.226
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Law is a "social construct". 227 It grows out of people's needs. 228
While law involves fairness and efficiency, the major purpose of a
legal system is to provide civiljustice. Rules of law govern the satis-
faction of claims and the discharge of obligations. When parties
cannot resolve disputes, they turn to courts. Impartial judges and
218. See id. at 788-89 (outlining duties under MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-
736(4) (a)-736(4) (d) (1989)).
219. See id. at 790-91 (discussing Mead's conduct and statutory provisions).
220. See id. at 789.
221. See id. (noting defense asserted plaintiff had left trail and was not on ski
terrain).
222. See Mead, 872 P.2d at 788-89 (deciding whether rocky outcropping was
"bare spot").
223. See id. at 789 ("There is no indication in the record whether the rocky
outcropping would normally be covered with snow at that location, and if so,
whether the amount of snow which normally covered the surface would have been
sufficient to prevent the kind of injury in this case.").
224. See id. (noting evidence presents question of fact).
225. See id. (observing conflicting deposition testimonies).
226. See id. at 791 (reversing district court and remanding case).
227. See William E. Nelson, From Fairness to Efficiency: The Transformation of Tort
Law in New York, 1920-1980, 47 Burr. L. Rrv. 117, 226 (1999) (describing tort law
as social construct "which grows out of the needs and ideas of the people").
228. See id. (observing tort law's changes and predicting its further evolution).
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juries hear claims and decide which are valid. Justice through liti-
gation involves significant costs, but the alternative - injustice and
anarchy - would be costlier.
Many Americans are unwilling to accept responsibility for their
injuries and seek to blame others. In the absence of a governmen-
tal safety net, they resort to lawsuits to recover damages to pay for
medical bills and institutional care. Thereby, litigation serves as a
substitute for more extensive social welfare programs. 229 This
recompensatory system, however, fails to compensate ninety per-
cent of injured persons, and victims only receive about one-third of
amounts paid out.230 Persons with minor injuries cannot afford to
litigate. Moreover, all lawsuits involve costs for legal counsel and
governmental judicial resources. 231
Experts have suggested numerous ideas to modify legal rules to
thwart some of the inefficiencies and abuses that the media so read-
ily shares with us. Dependence on common law negligence may
not be the most effective response to injuries. 232 Reconciling the
deterrence of dangerous situations, responsibilities of personnel
overseeing sport activities, and obligations of participants present
challenges. 233 Concerns about excessive litigation and expenses in
defending lawsuits suggest legislatures might want to consider legis-
229. Alternatively, does litigation operate to set social policy? See Deborah R.
Hensler, The New Social Policy Torts: Litigation as a Legislative Strategy Some Preliminary
Thoughts on a New Research Project, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 493, 495-96 (2001) (noting
"social impact litigation" is being used as tool to shape social policy); Deborah R.
Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large
Scale Litigation, 11 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 211 (2001) (questioning whether
litigation should be employed as "governance tool").
230. See David A. Hyman, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System: What Do We
Know and What (If Anything) Should We Do About It?, 80 TExAs L. REV. 1639, 1644
(2002) (claiming relatively few injured persons with medical malpractice claim
ever file their claim); Kagan, supra note 44, at 867 (observing debate that tort vic-
tims are either over- or under-compensated); see generally Marc Galanter, Real World
Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REv. 1093 (1996) (noting failure of tort law
to compensate needy, deserving victims).
231. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 44, at 854 (claiming high litigation costs and
legal unpredictability stem from basic structures of civil litigation in United States
and constitute tort litigation system which "can hardly be called anything but woe-
fully inefficient").
232. See Jeffrey O'Connell & Joseph R. Baldwin, (In)Juries, (In)Justice, and
(Il)Legal Blame: Tort Law as Melodrama - or Is It Farce?, 50 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 425, 456
(2002) (positing Americans should find efficacious alternatives to tort law that
lessen litigation's "intolerable uncertainties, delays, and transaction" costs espe-
cially after century of workers' compensation laws).
233. See Mark McLaughlin Hager, The Moral Economy of Victim Responsibility:
Substance and Product Abuse in Tort Reform's "Common Sense," 64 TENN. L. REv. 749,
762 (1997) (advocating that "victim's actual knowledge of danger" forms "proper
basis for defeating liability, but only where it outweighs the supplier's harm-
preventing capacity").
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lative changes. Laws can place additional obligations on partici-
pants to reduce litigation and the expenses that accompany this
compensation mode. The equestrian liability and sport responsibil-
ity statutes adopted by most states have enacted these obligations.
Alternatively, a somewhat wasteful insurance program might be su-
perior to a horribly inefficient litigation system. 234 Changing to a
program that adopts ideas from governmental workers' compensa-
tion and private no-fault insurance laws would seek to compensate
injured persons without major confrontations. Changes to the tort
system could reduce costs and direct more funds to injured
persons.
TABLE 1. EQUESTRIAN IMMUNITY STATUTES
State State Codifications
Alabama ALA. CODE § 6-5-337 (2005).
Alaska ALAsI STAT. § 09.65.290 (2005) (including equine
activity in general sports liability provision).
Arizona ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-553 (2005).
Arkansas AR.K. CODE ANN. §§ 16-120-201 to -202 (West 2005).
Colorado COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-119 (West 2005).
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557p (West 2005).
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8140 (2005).
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 773.01 - .05 (West 2005).
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. §§ 4-12-1 to -5 (West 2005).
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 663B-1 to -2 (LexisNexis
2005).
Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 6-1801 to -1802 (2005).
Illinois 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1 to 47/999 (West
2005).
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-2-40 to -43, 34-6-2-69, 34-6-2-
95, 34-31-5-1 to -5-5 (West 2005).
Iowa IowA CODE §§ 673.1-.3 (2005).
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-4001 to -4004 (2005).
Louisiana LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2795.1 (2005).
234. Social as well as private insurance must be employed to respond to acci-
dents. See Ulrich Magnus, Compensation for Personal Injuries in a Comparative Perspec-
tive, 39 WASHBURN LJ. 347, 362 (2000) (observing governments and private
insurance can assist in compensating for personal injuries so that "no one is finan-
cially ruined for life").
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Maine ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 4101, 4103-A (2005).
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 128, § 2d (2005).
Michigan MICH. COMp. LAWs ANN. §§ 691.1661-.1667 (West
2005).
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.12 (West 2005) (including
equine activity in liability immunity for livestock
activities).
Mississippi Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 95-11-1 to -11-7 (West 2005).
Missouri Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.325 (West 2005).
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-725 to -728 (2005).
Nebraska NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-21,249 to -21,253 (2005).
New N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508:19 (2005).
Hampshire
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:15-1 to -12 (West 2005).
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-13-1 to -5 (West 2005).
North N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99E-1 to -3 (2005).
Carolina
North N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-10-01 to -02 (2005).
Dakota
Ohio OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.321 (West 2005).
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, §§ 50.1-.4 (West 2005)
(including equine activity in Livestock Activities
Liability Limitation Act).
Oregon OR. REv. STAT. §§ 30.687 - .697 (2005).
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 4-21-1 to -4 (2005).
South S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-9-710 to -730 (2005).
Carolina
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 42-11-1 to -5 (2005).
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 44-20-101 to -105 (West 2005).
Texas TEX. Clv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 87.001-.005
(Vernon 2005).
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27b-101 to -102 (West 2005).
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1039 (2005).
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3.1-796.130 - .133 (West 2005).
Washington WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.530 - .540 (West
2005).
West Virginia W. VA. CODE §§ 20-4-1 to -7 (2005).
Wisconsin WiS. STAT. ANN. § 895.481 (West 2005).
Wyoming Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1-121 to -123 (2005) (addressing
I equine activity in Recreation Safety Act).
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TABLE 2
[Vol. 13: p. 37
State State Codifications
Alabama ALA. CODE § 6-5-342 (2005) (roller skating and
skateboarding).
Alaska ALAsKA STAT. §§ 05.45.010 - .210 (2005) (skiing).
ALAsKA STAT. § 09.65.290 (2005) (general sports).
Arizona Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-701 to -706 (2005) (skiing).
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-554 (2005) (baseball).
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT ANN. § 13-21-120 (West 2005)
(baseball).
COLO. REv. STAT ANN. §§ 33-44-101 to -114 (West
2005) (skiing).
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-211 to -213 (West 2005)
(skiing).
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.0085 (West 2005)
(skateboarding, inline skating, freestyle bicycling, and
paintball).
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-4-280 to -283 (West 2005)(fishing).
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-43 (West 2005) (roller skating).
Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 6-1101 to -1109 (2005) (skiing).
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 6-1201 to -1206 (2005)
(outfitters and guides).
Illinois 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 52/1 to 52/99 (West 2005)
(hockey facilities).
745 ILL. Comp. STAT'. ANN. 72/1 to 72/30 (West 2005)
(roller skating).
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-31-6-1 to 31-6-4 (West 2005)(roller skating).
Maine ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 601, 603-08 (2005)
(roller skating).
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 801-806 (2005)
(amusement rides).
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 15217-218 (2005)
(skiing).
Massachusetts MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 143, §§ 71H--71S (2005)
(skiing).
Michigan MICH. COMP. Aws ANN. §§ 408.321-.344 (West 2005)
(skiing).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1721-.1726 (West
2005) (roller skating).
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MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1541-.1544 (West
2005) (sport shooting).
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-651 to -655 (2005)
(snowmobiling).
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-731, 23-2-733 to -736 (2005)
(skiing).
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 37-47-401 to -404 (2005)
(outfitters and guides).
Nevada NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 455A.010-.190 (West 2005)
(amended by Act of May 24, 2005, ch. 148, 2005 NV
Laws 261 (expanding original skiing statute to include
snowboarding)).
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 455B.010-.100 (West 2005)
(amusement rides).
New N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 225-A:1 to -A:26 (2005)
Hampshire (pending legislation of H.B. 619, 2005 Leg., 159th
Sess. (N.H. 2005) (expanding original skiing statute to
include snowboarding, snowshoeing, and
snowtubing)).
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:13-1 to -11 (West 2005) (skiing).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:14-1 to -7 (West 2005) (roller
skating).
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-15-1 to -14 (West 2005)
(skiing).
New York N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 18-101 to -107 (McKinney
2005) (pending legislation of Assemb. B. 02962, 2005
Leg., 228th Sess. (N.Y. 2005)) (expanding ski statute
to include snowboarding).
N.Y. LAB. LAw §§ 865-868 (McKinney 2005)
(pending legislation of Assemb. B. 02962, 2005 Leg.,
228th Sess. (N.Y. 2005)) (expanding statutory
language to include snowboarding).
North N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99C-1 to -5 (2005) (skiing).
Carolina
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99E-10 to -14 (2005) (roller
skating).
North N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-09-01 to -11 (2005) (skiing).
Dakota
Ohio OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4169.01-.99 (West 2005)
(pending legislation of S.B. 61, 126th Gen. Assemb.
Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005)) (amending statute to include
more activities).
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4171.01-.10 (West 2005)
(roller skating).
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Oregon OR. REv. STAT. §§ 30.970-.990 (2005) (skiing).
Pennsylvania 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7102(c) (West 2005) (skiing). See
DeWeese v. Weaver, 880 A.2d 54, 55 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2005) (holding comparative negligence section of
§ 7102 unconstitutional as it applies to sex offenders
and proposed DNA Act).
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 41-8-1 to -4 (2005) (skiing).
South S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 52-21-10 to -60 (2005) (ice and
Carolina roller skating).
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAwS §§ 32-20A-21 to -23 (2005)
(snowmobiling).
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-114-101 to -107 (West 2005)
(skiing).
Texas TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 759.001-.005
(Vernon 2005) (roller skating).
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 760.001-.006
(Vernon 2005) (ice skating).
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 47-3-1 to -3-3 (West 2005) (sport
shooting).
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1037-1038 (2005) (skiing).
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 79A.45.010-.060 (West
2005) (skiing).
West Virginia W. VA. CODE §§ 20-3A-1 to -8 (2005) (skiing).
W. VA. CODE §§ 20-3B-1 to -3B-5 (2005) (whitewater
rafting).
Wisconsin Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.525(4) (West 2005) (contact
sports).
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1-121 to -123 (2005)
(recreational sports).
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-9-301 (2005) (skiing).
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